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. Notice:  this report uses the new numbering of  th~ :Ec Treaty articles, following 
the  entry' into  force  of the  Amsterdam  Treaty  on  May  1,  1999.  The  old 
mi.:nbering is nevertheless still sho~ri in brackets~· ·  · 
.  .  '  . 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  By· Regulation  N°  1534/91 of- 31  May  19911, ·the  Council  empowered  the 
Commission to adopt a. Regulation on the application of Article 81.-3  (ex-Article 
85-3)  of 'the  EC  treaty to certain  types  of agreements  between  undertakings, 
decisions  of associations  of undertakings  and  concerted  practice·s  (hereafter 
agre_ements)  in the field of insurance. This empowerment concerns 'in particular 
agreements  concerning a) 'the joint' establishment  of tariffs  of risk  premiums 
based on collective statistics or on the number of claims, b) the establishment of 
. standard insurance conditions, c) the joint coverage of certain types of risks, d) 
scttlcincnt of claims,  c)  verification  and  ~tpprov:al  t'>f  safety  equipment  and  I) 
registers and  infi.lrmatit)n systems concerning aggravated .risks.  ·  · 
It.  is  worth  recalling  thai  agreements  having  the  aim .or  effect  of restricting 
competition within the meaning of  Article 81-1 (ex-Article 85-1) of  the treaty can 
be authorised under Article 81-3 (ex-Article 85-3) if  they contribute to promoting 
technical or economic progress or to improving production or the distribution of 
insurance products and if  insured persons derive benefit from them, provided that 
the.  restrictions  are  limited . to . what  is  strictly  necessary  (principle  of 
·proportionality). and that they do not entirely-eliminate competition on the market 
in question.  ·  .--
OJWL.I43of07.06.199l,p. I. 
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I -2.  Basing  itself on the· empowering  Regulation  of the  Council,  the  Commission 
adopted on 21  December 1992 its Regulation N° 3932/92 aiming to exempt four 
of  _the  six  types .of above-mentioned2  agreements.  This  Regulation  covers  the 
agreements  on  calculation  _of  premiums,  on  the  establishment  of  policy. 
conditions,  on_  the  joint  coverage  of certain  types  of risk  and  on  security 
equipment. The Commission considered it did not have sufficient experience as 
regards  treatment  of agreements  on the  settlement of claims  and  registers  of 
aggravated  risks  to  include  these  agr~ements in  the  field  of its, Exemption 
· Regulation (hereafter the Regulation). 
·under Article 8 of the Council empowering Regulation, the Commission has to 
submirto the European Parliament and-to the Council a report on the functioning 
of its Regulation and formulate, if  necessary, draft amendments. The Commission 
has to submit this report no ·later than six years after the entry into force of the 
_Regulation (1  April 1993).  · 
This report c~mplies with that request. It includes a first part on the application of 
Article  81  (e;x:-Article  85)  to  the ·four  types  of agreements  covered  by  the 
Regulation and a second part (significantly shorter) _on the application of Article 
81  (ex-Article 85) to the two types of agreements not covered by the Regulation. 
For each type of  agreement~ the Commission presents a number of considerations 
of a. general  nature,  describes  its  practical  experience  and .  mentions  possible 
_.future  developme!lts.  The·  report  does  not  contain  adopted  proposals  for 
modifications.  It  does  however contain a  number of forward-looking  ideas  on 
which  the  Commission  wishes  -to  receive  comments  from  r~gulatory  and 
competition authorities of  the Member States and from interested parties. 
3.  · Before going into details, it is worth making some general comments. 
2 
First of all, the Regulation aims, like any other exemption Regulation, to free the 
Commission from examining a large number of similar agreements and to allow 
it  to  devote  its  resources to  the exami-nation of cases  which deserve a  spccitic 
analysis. Before the entry into force of the Regulation, the Commission's services 
(DG IV) were apprised of  several hundred n.otified agreements. As from the entry 
into force of the Regulation, the notifying parties were invited to specify if they 
wished to maintain their notification(s)or if, on the other hand; they insisted on a 
formal  position from  the  Commission on the  compatibility of the  agreements 
notified with Article 81  (ex-Article 85). The Commission moreover indicated that 
in  the  event of silence  six  months  after receipt of this  invitation,  they  would 
proceed- to  close  the  cases  without  further  action.  This  approach  allowed  the 
reduction of the number of current notifications to a few dozen. The majority of 
these  in  fac~  concerned  agreements  aiming  to  create  co-insurance  or  co-
reinsurance groupings (hereafter pools). It should be stressed immediately that the 
evaluation of these agreements in the  light .of the provisions of the  Regulation 
(Title IV) is by far the most complex one.and will continue to be a priority for the 
Commission in the years to corne. 
OJ N° L.398 of  31.-12.1992, p. 7. 
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Like any other exemption Regulation, the Regulation contributes to ~ecentralised _ 
application of Community competition  law.  Indeed,  both  national jurisdiCtions 
. 'and. national  competition  authorities  are  themselves  competent to  check  if an' . 
.  agreement  meets  the conditions  for  application of the  Regulation  and bendits, 
consequently, froin an  exemption.  Since ti1e  entry into  torce of  the  Regulation, 
the Commission, in addition, has laid down the methods of co-operation between 
itself and these jurisdictions and national authorities3.  In 'the  field of insurance, 
however, the Commission does not have_ a full list of the cases in which national 
-jurisdictions or authorities have jmplemented the Regulation. It considers that it 
would he. useful  to  have  such  a  list before  formulating  precise  proposals  fo'r  .  .  ~ 
amendm~nts to  the Regulation. Consequently it invites.the national competition 
authorities  to  provide  it  with  such  lists.  These  rnfght  constitute/a base  for  a 
discussion,  within  the  Consultative  Conimittee  on  agreements  aiJd  dominant 
. positions, on the application of  the Regulatiqn. 
·_Since  the  entry  into  force  of the  R;.egulation,  the  Commissi01)'s .services· have 
twice had the opportunity. of  providing explanations on the implementation of  this 
Regulation  to  the  monitoring  authorities  of the  Member  States,  within  the 
_framework of the Committee onJnsurance which meets under the chairmanship-
_ofDGXV.  1  , 
FIRST PART 
THE CATEGORIES OF AGREEMENTS COVERED  _-
BY THE RE.GULA TION 
I. Calculation of premiums (Title H) 
A.-General information  -
4.  The cqmmercial (or gross) premium is  the price that the person insured pays for 
the!  covering of a given risk. This price comprises an elemenr which reflects the 
net cost of this cover. This is the risk premium. It is fixed according to the  ~ize  · 
. {the intensity) o.f _the  insured risk as well as to 'the frequency with which this risk 
occurs.  Insurers  fix  the  risk  prernium  by· first  determining· the  pure  (or  net) 
premium,. which is based on th~ statistical data concerning the frequency and the 
average intensity of the risk in the past, and by  th~n applying to it a coefficient 
.  which. takes  account .of- forecast~ of the  future  occurrence  of the  risk.  The 
"commercial  (or- gross).  premium  corresponds  to  the  risk  premium  plus  the 
, administrative 'costs and the profit margin of  the indiviqual insurers.  · 
5.  The  Regulation  permits  insurers  to  .co-operate  with·  a  view  to  calculating- a 
- · uniform pure premium  co~esponding to  the -average  cost of covering _the  risks. 
3  See its  communication~ of 1993 (OJ  N~ C)9 of 13:02.1993, p.  IO)·and of 1997 (OJ  N° C.313 of 
'  15.10.199?, p9).  .  . - ' 
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Article 2.a specilies that co-operation  has  to  be  limited to  what is  necessary  to 
create reliable statistical data on the intensity and the frequency of claims in  the 
pa~t. Insurers can also jointly carry out studies with a view to making forecasts on 
the  frequency  or  the  extent of clairns  in  future  (Article  2.b)  without  however 
calculating' jointly  the  security  charge  which  aims  to  take  account  of these 
forecasts  (Article  3.b).  Co-operation  between  insurers  cannot  lead  to  joint 
ca\culation  either  of administrative  expenses  or  of insurers'  profit  margins 
(ibidem).  · 
6:  The ralid legis of Title· II  is as follows. Each individuar risk  is specific. It varies 
according to a series of parameters. For ex.ample, the intensity and the frequerycy 
of the  automobile  third-party  liability  risk  incurred  by  an  individual  person 
insured will depend on a combination of factors, such as the·type of car (model, 
engine  power),  the  place· of registration,  the  driver's  personal  profile  (age, 
profession), etc. An in·surer will  seek to  avoid (or at  least to  reduce as much  as 
possible) the "dispersal",  i.e.  the divergence between; on  the  one hand,  the  real 
value of a claim for which the person insured has to be compensated and,.on the 
other hand,  the  premium  which the  person  insured has  paid.  To  this  end;  the 
insurer will group similar risks and will calculate their average cost. The dispersal 
will decrease as a) the· grouped risks are rhore homogeneous and b) the number of 
such  risks is  higher.  Article  2.a)  permits  insurers  to. carry .out  precisely  this 
grouping of risks.  It is  the job of actuaries  and  statisticians  to  determine  the 
sufficient-number for each type of risk. Article 2.b) enables insurers to complete 
their statistical data by jointly undertaking studies on the future  development of 
the risk in  question.  Such co-operation makes it possibie to  improve knowledge 
of  the risks and facilitates their evaluation by individual companies (see recital6). 
In  this respect,  it  is· worth adding a nuance. The question of to  what extent an 
insurer needs really to  co-operate with  its competitors as· regards calculation of 
premiums, will depend on its size.  Thus, one cannot rule out tha( a large insurer 
. might on its own have a sufficient size to cover sufficient  s~milar risks to obtain 
· reliable  statistical  data.  In  such  cases,  any  co-operation  within ·the  meaning of 
Title II would  have the  purpose - from  its  point of view - not of improving  its  . 
own knowledge of the risks,  but rather that of its competitors whose size is  not 
sufficient to cover enough similar risks. At that moment, the virtue of such a co-
operation changes. It .establishes a certain solidarity between insurers of different 
sizes and thus creates a level playing field to the benefit of  smaller insurers 4• 
B. Practical experience 
7.  The Commission has not had to examine in detail. agreements providing for joint 
·premium  calculation  in  the  field· of life  insurance.  On  the· other hand, ..it  has 
considere<:l a number of agreements of this type in the field of  non-life insurance. 
4  Title  II  thus goes  beyond the decisions Nuovo  Cegam  (OJ N°  L 99 of 11.04. 1984,  p.  29) and 
.Concordato !ncendio (OJ W  L  15  of 19.0I.l990, p.  25)  by which  the  Commission  exempted 
agreements on  premium calculation. In  those two cases, the parties to the agreement represented 
only  a  part  of the  market  (respectively 26% and  50%)  and  the  Commission .had  justified  the 
exemption while referring to the difficulties that members would have encountered In entering the 
m!lrket without su~h an agreement.  · 
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All  these  cases  involved recommendations  emanating  from  insurers'  national 
associations  .. In  other  words,  co-operation  as  regards  calculation of premiums 
extended to (almost) all the active operators on the national market concerned.  · 
In  t~o cases (on~ involving the German association- VdS, the other the  Belgian 
associadon UPEA), the examination took place with,o~t any formal-procedure.  A 
third  case  concerned  a  notification  carried  out by· UPEA  ..  The ·last two  cases 
. (pertaining  to  recommendations  from  the  Italian  association  ANIA)  were  the 
. subject of  a ex officio procedure.  · 
S.  The German case concerned the c9mpilation of statisticsconcerning third  party 
···.  ! ..  .  liability risks for·cars.  The·association· Verband de,r  Sachversicherer (VdS) had· 
.. set itself the goal of determining the average cost of covering the .risks (average 
~. pure. premium) according to  the  engine  output  as  well  as  claims  rates  in .  the 
various regioris. Iri Germany, there are 400 regions for car registrations. The· V  dS 
'  ..  '•  . 
. · had claimed that it was ne_cessary·to.have at least approximately thirty thousand: 
risks to calCulate in a reliable way the· regiomil claim rate.  This is  why -the  V  9S 
... had included neighbouring regions and had used 320 regions covering each one at 
..  , least thirty  thousand. risks.  It had  jnformally  .. asked .  the.  Commission's  services · 
whether it could·-further. group the· 320·: pure premiums J;"esulting .from this first 
. classification  into  ten  :overall  regional  classes.  At  the  ·end  of  1995,  the 
,. , ·  Commission's ·services  ans~ered· in  the. negative, commenting that this  second 
grouping exceeded the limits laid dpwn by ArtiCle 2a) of  the Regulation. Indeed, 
· ·  .:  ·the  number  sufficient to. ton~titute : "the  population" which .  can~ be ,,handled 
. statistically"  within· the. meaning of this  provision ·had  been .reached  with -the. 
reduction.:to 320 regions.· It was therefore for the individual insurers.to reduce this 
-humber still further and to make their ~~n  wi~er  classes.  . 
..  ~ 
/. 
9. 
.. , 
Th~ case involving the  B~lgian professipnal association of insurance co!hpanies 
·(UPEA) had been communicated ·to the Tommission's services  by the  Belgian·· 
consumers' "association  Test  Achats~ ,Jt  had  complained,  inter  alia,  about  a 
recommendation from UPEA aiming to establish ·a  minimum pure premium for 
the  coverage of hospital  expenses in  the case of group contracts  .. There was  a . 
uniform preiniunl··for contracts with groups· containing up to  10 .members and 
. reductions: for: contracts. with larger groups. There was nothing to indicate that this 
recommendation  was . based  on  statistical  data.  The·  Commission's  services, 
.. conseque~tly, concluded that the  recommendation: was:. not in .conformity  with·- . 
Title II  and they informed Test Achats and- UP  EA.  The matter. was then pursued 
before national jurisdictions. The Commercial· Court and then the Brussels Court 
of Appeal both followed the informal standpoint of the- Commission's services5. 
Currently, the case. is being dealt with by the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) . . 
'  .. )  . 
I 0.  The 'other· case  lnvol.ving  UPEA · involved  a  recommendation  concerning  the 
·calcuiation of.pn::miu~s for so-called special risks,  co~cerning. fire ,coverage  fo_r 
movable and immovable properties-~with-a value above a certain amouh(·aii.d thus 
·  .in  particular  numerous  indystrial  properties.  UPEA had  already; notified ·this 
recommendati'On in 1988,  well  before  the -entry  int~- force  of the. ·Regulation  . 
. '5- Judgement of  the President of the Tribunal de Commerce ofSept. I, ·1995, upheld by the Brussels 
··  Court of  Appeals <;>n  May 24, 1996.  . 
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Instead  of recommending  ari  average  pure  premium,  UPEA  encouraged  its 
members  to  Increase  or decrease the  "basic commercial  premium",  that  is.  the 
hasic  pure  premium plus the  administration and  distribution  expenses  (~f each 
individual  in·surer.  The' choice of this  base  already  placed  the  recommendation 
outside· the  scope of the  Regulation.  Moreover,  each  aggravating or mitigating 
factor was expressed as a. percentage increase or reduction (typically 10%) which 
did  not appear to  be  founded  on any  statistical exercise  - a  further  reason  to 
conc~ude that  t~e  ·  r~_comme~da~ion :was  not  covered  by  the  Regulation.  This 
.  ~onclusion was finally corroborated· by  a dedatation of UPEA itself according to 
which the premiunis actually charged by  the insurers were generally appreciably 
lower than those which would result from  the application of the recommended 
. tariff  Having  regard  to  the.  considerable  divergences  between  the  premiums 
charged by insurers, the Commission's services restricted themselves to informing 
UPEA  of the  incompatibility  of its  recommendation  with  Title  II  and  finally 
closed.the case without furtheraction.  · 
11 .. Finally the Commission's services launched two "ex officio" (own initiative) cases. 
to examine recommendations_ from ANIA. ·  · 
The first recommendation concerned the application  ~y insurers of surcharges to 
marine  cargo i!lsurance  premiums.  Since  these  surcharge~ were  added  to  the 
(gross) commercial premiums, the  recommendation of ANIA resembled the one 
by  the  V  dS  that . the  Corvruission  had  formally -_condemned  in  198.7  and  the 
Regulation  seemed  obviously  inapplic<~;ble  to  it.  Following  the  sending  of a 
formal  statement of o~jectio.ns, ANIA  explained at.the oral  hearing  (and  then 
confirmed in writing) that the  surch~rges were .expressed in percentage terms of 
the value of the assets ensured (and not of the commercial premium) and that all· 
.these percentages had (l stati.stical base. Under these conditions, the Commission's 
services decided tQ  close the case without further" action as  soon as  ANIA has 
furthermore  clarified that  it.s  recommendation is  purely 'indicative and  does not 
commit its members a1 all (See Article 3a) .. 
ln  1997, the Commission's services initiated an "own initiative" procedure with 
the aim of  checking if son:te other recommendations of ANIA really meet all the 
conditions for application of Title Il pf Regulation 3932/92. This involves inter 
alia recommendations' or databases as regards motor insurance (ind.uding general 
risks, theft, fire,  and third. party  liability)6  . This procedure again confronts the 
Commission's services. with. the difficult task of checking the compatibility of an 
agreement with Title II. The examination currently in hand aims to check, on. the 
-one hand, ifthe data that each insurer. has to provide to ANIA is limited ·to  wh~t is 
necessary to determine the average frequency of the· claims and the average cost 
. of cover and, on  the other hand, what effect the recommendation produces on the 
commerc~al premiums that insurers charge in practice. 
.  .  . 
6  At the beginning of 1993, ANIA had ce~ified that the recommendation on  various car insurance 
risks (theft~ fire) ~ould  be modified in the light of  the provisions of  Title -II of  the  Regulation~ The 
Italian competition authority (the Autorita)-then challenged the  validity under Italian competition 
law of this recommendation as well as of other recommendations,  for the reason  that  It  led  the 
insurers to apply uniform commercial premiums. The ·Autorita adopted a prohibition decision and 
imposed a fine on  ANI A, but the latter obtained the annulment ofthe fine first·by the· Latium court 
and then by a decision of the Council of  State.  · 
6 (  .. 
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C. Future prospcds 
12 ..  Tlfc  legality  test  stated  in  Title  II  is  clear:  co-operation  as  regards  premium 
calculation has to remain within the limits of what is nece.ssary to  form groups of 
comparable risks in sufficient number to constitute· a population capable of being 
handled statisdcally (ArtiCle ia). Each  insurer must hav~ free  choice as· to  thc 
setting-up of other groups. It will make its choice on the basis of criteria related 
to .statistical technique but als~ ofother criteria. related to its cqmmercial policy. 
If the  legality test is clear,  its ·implementation is  not easy·  .. The  risk  grouping  .· 
·permitted. by  the  Regulation  is  a  technical· exercise  that.  insurers .entrust  to 
actuaries and that  th~ c~mmission'.s services are-not in a  positic:;m to amtlyse and · 
to  evaluate  in. detail.  In addition, if they  started  such an effort, the· Regulation. 
would, lose its raison d'etre, namely to make it ·possible to insurers to have their 
agreements  benefit  from  an exemption  without. ·having  to  notify  them  to  the 
Commission .. 
The  Commissio-n's. serv'ices  will  therefore  restrict  themselves  to·· examining 
whether  the  body  instructed  to· calculate the  average·. pure  premium  only  a) 
collects  from  insurers -the  data.,necessary  from· a  statistical  point  of view Jo- · 
calcuhtte.this premium and  b)  then passes on  to  them only this aggregated data  ,. 
-.  :(namely the total. number of claims during the period of observation and the total · · 
··  ._' ofthe· payments made o~due-in  re~pect.ofthe claims which h~lVe occurred during 
th.is·period).  .  ·  · 
.·J f they experience difficulties in checking whether the ·conditions of  application 
of  Title II  of the: Regulation  are  met, the Commission's ·se~ices will examine 
" what  concrete  effect  the  co~operation as  regards  calculation  of the  premiums. 
produces on the market ip. questi6n.-If insurers depart from·the joint calculations 
of the average pure premium. and/or apply ·different commercial premiums, the  .. 
Commission's services will have to evaluate the extent of  the departure and/orthe 
differences· with·. a  view.  to  judging: if the  agreement  in  question  restricts 
competition in an appreciableway. If  that is not the case, it will not be necessary 
to intervene. 
II. Standard. policy conditions (Titre Ill)  .  . 
A. General 
·.  .  .  .·  . 
IT  Title. III  exempts agreements which  have  as their object the es-tablishment and  . 
. distribution of standard policy conditions for direct insurance (Article. 5-l) as well 
as common models illustrating the profits to be realised from an_insurance policy · . , 
involving an element of  capitalisation (Article 5-2). 
These  agreements  restrict  competition  insofar as they .tend  to  lead  to  uniform 
conditions  being  offered  by  i~surers, and  th~refore to  limit  customer  choice.' 
However, they "have the advantage of improving the. compar~bility ofcover for 
7 
.·· the consumer and of allowing risks to be classified more uniformly" (recital 7). 
· As full -standardisation  would. not  lea:ve  customers  much  to  choose  from,  the 
exemption only applies to standard conditions or common models which indicate 
explicitly  that  they  are  ptir~ly  iHustrative,  i.e.  that. they  are  established  for· 
guidance  only  (Article  6:1  and  6-2).  Furthermore,  insurers  are  not  allowed  to 
· agree· among themselves that the standardisea policy conditions are the only ones 
to be appl'ieli by"them (Article 7-2).  ·  -
..... ,.  -....  ~  . . .  ... 
14 ..  Sinc·e the entry into force of the Regulation, the Commission's services have  ~ot 
had  to  handle  any  cases related to  common  models. The  present  Report  wili 
therefore focus on the scope of Articles 7 and 8 regarding policy conditions. 
15 ..  Article 7 contains a  li~t of conditions which insurers cannot agree to impose on 
their customers. These (under the Regulation) unexemptable standard conditions 
arc known as  «black clauses». By arid large, they fall' into three categories .. 
The first category comprises the clauses featuring in Article 7-1  sub a to d.  These 
all.  co~cem the  exte"nt  of the cover. Those ·excluding from. the cover certain risks 
belonging to the _class of inSl!fanCe concerned (sub a),  making the COVer of certain 
risks subject to specific  condition~ (sub b)  or· imposing comprehensive cover for 
risksto which a significant number of-policyholders is not simult~eously exposed 
· (sub c) are unexempta.ble unless they indicate that insurers remain free to derogate 
from them. The clause sub d indicating the amount of the cover or the « excess » 
(i.e.  the  amount  not  covered)  is  « black» under  all  circumStances  (i.e.  even  if 
insurers can derogate from it).  · 
A second set of  clauses (sub e to  i) deals with the duration of  the policy and aims at 
avoiding  insurers creating too captive a customer base.  Two of these clauses arc 
nevertheless exemptable under the Reg~latiori if their application is made subject to 
the express consent of the policyholder (sub e and f).  The others are unexemptable 
without further qu~lification. 
The third series of clauses {sub j and-k) concerns forms of tying . One requires the 
policyholder to obtain cover from the same insurer for different risks whereas the  -. 
, · other one requires the person acquiring a risk from the policyholder to take over the 
latter's insurance policy. 
16.  Moreover,  according  to  Article  8; the . block  exemption  does  not  apply  to 
agreements  whereby  insurers  undertake . to . exclu.de  cover  for  certain  risk 
categories because of the characteristics associated with the policyholder. Article 
8  does,.  however,  allow. them  to  establish  specific  insurance  conditions  for. 
particular social or occupational categories of  the population  .. 
B. Practical exp~rience 
17.  Many  notifications  made prior to  the entry  into  force  of the  Regulation,  were 
·subsequently· withdrawn  by  the  parties  because  they  considered  the  notified 
agreements  to  be  in  line  with  the  Regulation.  Some  other  noti-fications  w9rc. 
maintained because the  parties saw room  for  interpreting  the  provisions of the 
Regulation,  especially  those . listing  the  « black »  clauses  and  sought  the· 
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Commission's.  services'  assurance  that  th~- notified  clauses . were  indeed 
cxcmptable. Occasionally, the Commission's services have also been .called  up~m 
to clarify the scope of Article '?,outside the framework of  a formal  notification. In 
one such instance, it was an informal complaint that prOIJlpted them to-do so (see 
below).  · · ·  .  · 
18.  In  some cases, the raison d'etre itself of Article 7-1  sub a has been called into : 
question for certain allegedly « uninsurable» risks . Insurers submitted that they 
should be allowed to exclude by common agreement such risks from any cover.  : 
For  instance;  flood  risks  in  the Netherlands,  in  particular  from salty  water  (a 
substantial part_ of the country lies  ~elow  -sea  level), are  said to  be  uninsurable. · 
The national organisation of  insurers (VvV) had decided to pre_vent insurers from  -
·.  offering  cover  for  flood  risks  (from  salty  as  well  as  from  fresh. water). ·The 
Commission's  scrvi~cs queried why  there  was  any  need for such a decision  if 
insurers considered the risks  to  be  uninsurable anyway. The VvV defended the 
decision by emphasising the unique situation in·the Netherlands.  In  some other 
countries, a numper of different catastrophic risks (flood, fire,  etc.) are incurred 
by  different  regions.  Thfs  enables the  government. to impose solidarity. on the 
· 'entire population and· insurers to offer a global insurance. for all  the_se  risks.· This 
was' impossible in the Netherlands. In-this respect, the VvV referred to the plan to 
have an insurance pool for fresh water flood risks in which the insurers as well as 
the government would take part. The Dutch State Council, however, _had blocked 
the  project  on the  ground  that  it  wa's  unreasonable  to  have  six  million  fire 
insurance policies subsidise the 200,000  policie~ of households really  incurring 
that risk. Eventually, the VvV brought its binding decision in line with Article 7.1 
sub a by  simply conveqing it  into a ·non-binding ·recommendation, leaving each 
insurer free to extend cover to flood risks. 
In  another case,  a  common agreement to  ~xclude wru:  risks  frorri  marine  hull 
. i!lsu_rance  was at stake.  Thi~ was not considered by the Commission's services as. 
contrary to  Article 7-1  (a) in  so far as this provision. only aims at the exclusion · 
from  cover of losses « normally» relating to  the  class of insurance  concerned.· 
The term « normally »,  however, does not appear in all  language versipns. This 
issue will have-to addressed when the Regulation expires. 
19.  The exact meaning of:Article 7-1  (d) has also been discussed several .times. As a 
matter of fact, the ·only complaint which the Commission's services have received 
in  connection with Title III  concerned this provision. The (informal) compl(!int 
was lodged by Test Achats, a Belgian consumers' organisation, and WaS  directed 
against inter ali~ the recommendation issued ·by UPEA concerning a standard cover 
and the above.:mentioned standard excess for hospitalisation costs (for the aspects 
regarding Title II  see  above  paragraph 9).  UPEA  proposed to  limit the  cover to 
twice the  amount of the costs which the insured 'could recover as. an affiliate of a 
basic social security institution, and to set the excess aLiO% of that cover(with a 
ceiling  of 20,000  BF).  The  Commission's  services  took  the  vtew  that  this 
recommendation violated Article7-1 sub d.7 
7  A~ indicated above (pa~agraph 9), the matter ~as pursued further in the national courts. 
9 
il ·The formally notified German Gliededaxe also raised an issue of  interpretation with 
regard to Article 7-1 sub d. ,As in the war fisk case above, the interpretation problem 
is  due  to· a  lack of concordance  between the various  language  versions  of this 
provision. According to the German text, the block exemption is. inapplicable not 
only if insurers agree on the· amount of cover but also if they agree on any. other 
indication(« Angabe «)related to cover. A recommendation issued by the German 
· association  of insurers ·(GDV)  regarding  general  accident  insurance  spells  out 
invalidity degrees for people who have lost a body part (e.g. limbs) or a sense organ. 
These indications  have an impact on the ·level of cover offered  by  the  insurers. 
While  declaring  Article·  7-1  sub  d  applicable,  the  Commission's  services 
. nevertheless  saw  enough  reason  for  issuing  a  comfort  letter  to  the. GDV  in 
September 1998. They were indeed unable to rebut the argument that the absence of 
uniform iiwalidity degrees would lead to such a lack of  market transparency that the 
insured would not  be  in a  position to profit from  competition between insurers. 
Moreover, the Commission's services took into accoljnt the fact that the invalidity 
degrees  were based on  medical experience  and  that  insurers  in  any  event  were 
allowed to derogate from the G/iedertaxe.  · 
In  1996, the standard « 3/4ths collision liability » clause in marine hull insurance 
(whiCh is essentially a property insurance) was also looked at under ArtiCle 7-1  sub 
d.  The question was whether the remaining  Y,.  liability had to be considered as a 
uniform excess in violation of Article 7-1  sub d.  However, there appeared to be 
. sep3n1te coverfor that remaining Y,.  liability (offered either by the hull insurer or by 
P.  &  L  Clubs).  In  other words, there  was no  genuine excess.  In  any event,  the 
Commission's services obtained from the Institute of London Underwriters (ILU) 
and  the  Lloyd's  Underwriters' ·Association  (LU~) that they  clarified  that· the·% 
liability clause was not a binding one.  · 
20.  Finally,  Article  7-1  sub  e has  been  discussed  a  few  times.  The  Commission's 
·services had to comment on GDV standard policy conditions allowing insurers to 
maintain the policy in the event that they increase the premium _without changing _the 
cover (in  casu  car insurance) or cancel  part of the cover (in  casu  piracy risk  in 
marine insurance). Such policy conditions are unexemptable under the Regulation 
unless they provide for the express. consent of the policy holder that the policy be 
maintained  ..  In  both  case!),  the  Commission's  services  nevertheless  accepted  the 
standard policy conditions in so far as they provided for an adequate notice period 
(requiring the policy holder to express his dissent)  . 
21.  Pursuant to Article 8, ·,the Regulation is inapplicable to agreements which exclude 
the coverage of certain risk categories because of characteristics. pertaining to the 
policyholder.· A  standard policy_ clause. excluding from general accident insurance 
peoplewho permanentlyrequire extensive care or who are mentally ill was·declared. 
contrary to Article 8.  The fact that the exclusion would occur only some time after 
the conclusion of  the insurance contract was considered irrelevant.  .  . 
C. Future prospects 
22.  As some of the  examples commented aboye  illustrate,  discordance  between  the 
different language versions of  the Regulation has occasionally proved to be a source 
of  interpretation  problems.  This  Report  provides  the  Commission  with  an 
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opportunity to invite all  interested parties to signal other discordances· which have 
led.to a lack of  clarity and to suggest ways to amend the current te~ts  ... 
23.  1\..s ,previously  mentioned,. three  standard  clauses  enumerated  in  Article  7-1. arc 
consjdercd to  be unexemptable under the Regulation unless they indi.cate that ·each 
. individual  insurer  remains  fr~e to  derogate  from  therrt.  This  is  the  case  f9r  the 
·clauses set forth  in  ArtiCle  7-1  sub (a)  to (c).  The rationale for  this qualifica.tion 
needs to be revisited. 
.First of  all, Article 6-1 'already provides that the Regulation only applies. to« white» 
clauses, if ((they are  .. established.and di~trlbuted with an explicit statement thatthey 
arc purely illustrative>>, i.e. only if they leave each insurer the· freedom to  derogate 
from them. The qualification added in Article 7-1  sub a to c therefore in effect blurs  . 
the  distinction  between  ".white"  and  "black"  clauses.  Secondly,  whether  or  not  · 
particular standard policy conditions contain an explicitstatement that insurers are  · 
not bound by them, what matters is whether these conditions constitute the <<  faithfu! 
reflection» of the insurance association's resolve to co-ordinate the conduct of its 
members  On·  the  marketS ..  This  would be  the  Cas~ if in  practice  insurers  all 
implement the association's recommendation. Thirdly, Article 7-1  sub d and Art .8 
refer  simply  to  <<  black »  policy  conditions  (i.e.  even  if insurers  remain  free  to 
deviate from them). And yet, these conditions are generally not more harmf\d to .the 
insured than those mentioned in Article 7-1  sub a to c.  · 
24.  As  we  haye seen, the Regulation·is not applicable to agreements whereby insurers 
·commit themselves individually not to offer cover for certain risks (see Article 7-1 
sub (a) and Article 8). The question is  ~hether this should still be the cruie if these, 
insurers have decided to .offer such cover in coiTlirton by setting up a pool within the 
mcar1ing  of Title  IV  and  if thatpool is  in  accordance  with  the requirements . 
C<,mtained therein (see below).  .  · 
Ill Common coverage of  ce.rtain risks (Titre IV). 
A. General 
· 25.  Title  IV concerns  agreements  whereby  insurers  set  lip  co-msurance  and  co-
reinsurance pools for 'the purpose of covering  <<  an unspecified number of risks » 
(recital  1  0).  In  ·other  words,  ~it  only  concerns  institutionalised  popls  for  the 
. common coverage of  a specific category of  risks (or« groups» in the parlance of 
the  Regulation),  not  pools  which  insur~s creat~ ad hoc  in  order to  cover  a 
specified risk:The latter do not create any competition co·ncerns at all. 
26.  On  the  other  hand,  the  current  Regulation  is  based  on the· premise  that  any 
institutiomilised grouping is. in itself restrictive of competition; However, a pool 
can benefit from  the block  exemptio~ if the market share of its members· (or that 
. of the grouping itself where catastrophic or aggravated risks are concenied) doc~ 
not exc·eed a certain threshold. 
8  See ECJ judgement in  Verband der Sachversicherer, # 32-Case 45/85, ECR 1987, p. 405. 
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( In fact, pursuant to Article 11-1, a pool is exeinptable under the Regulation when  - . 
the market share of its participating members docs notexcced·lO% (in the case ()r 
co-insurance) or 15% (in the case of  to-reinsurance). The market share comprises 
the  members'  glob~l t"urriovcr  in  the  relevant  insurance  market,  irrespective or 
whether they do their business through the pool or independently. In this. context, · 
it must be  noted that the requirement that all risks be brought into the pool (the 
so-called  obligation  d:apport)  is  considered  as  an  excessive,  tinexemptable 
restriction of  competition (recital 13). 
Article 11-2 specifies that the market share to be taken into account in the case of 
.coverage  of catastrophic  or  aggravated  risks  only  relates  to  « the  insurance. 
products brought into the group», i.e.  the members' turnover made through the 
pool (subject to two conditions which are not repeated henb). 
The correct application of  Article .11  hinges on a proper definition of  the relevant-
product and geographic market.  In  a r:ecent  Notice, the Commission defines the 
relevant market as comprising all products which exercise competitive constraints 
on  the  product· under  consideration9.  It  identifies  the  three  main  constraints: 
demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential market entry . Since  . 
each  insurance  policy  .  is  unique;  and  therefore  demand  substitutability  is 
· theoretically  zero,  supply  substitutability  is  particularly  important  in  insurance 
market definition. As for  potential competition, this is not taken into account for 
the market definition but is taken into  account at a later stage,  to  evaluate the 
position of  the undertakings on this market (see Article 24 ofthe Notice) 
27.  The other provisions of the  Regulation,  in  particular Articles  10-3  and  10-4 as 
well as  Article  12  and Article  13  indicate which restrictions of their freedom of 
action the participants in the pool may subscribe to without the pool losing the 
benefit  of the  exemption  under  the  Regulation.  Some  of these ·restrictions 
appreciably restrict competition between the participants : e.g.  the obligation to 
use  identical policy conditions and premiums (risk premium in  the case of co-
reinsurance, commerCial premium in the case of  co-insurance).or the obligation to 
submit claim settlements to the pool for approval. Nevertheless, these r-estrictions 
are  considered to  be  inherent to  a pooling agreement.  Hence,  they  do not raise 
competition concerns on condition that the market share·thresholds laid down in 
Article 11  are not exceeded.  ·  .  ·  -
28. 
<) 
R  Practical experience 
Since  the  entry  into  force  of the  Regulation,  the  Commission's  services  have · 
developed their approach with regard to pools. Conc-eptually speaking, they apply 
a three-tier legality test t6 find out-whether a pool falls within the scope of-Article 
81-1  (ex-Article 85.1} The second step of this test is new, in the· sense that the 
Regulation does not explicitly provide for it. 
O.J. n° C.372 of09.12.1997, p. 5. 
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a)  The first question-is whether the  pool  (or its membership)' meets 'the markef 
share test set forth in Article· 11. pne of  the main difficulties encountered thus far 
is the adequate definition of  one or more relevant product and geographic markets 
and, subsequently, the accurate measurement" of  mar~et shares. This is due to the 
fact that the  insurance sector organises its  b~siness alqng the  lines of insurance 
r.isk  branches (annex to the Commission's first  non~life directive 10)  and that these 
branches do not necessarily correspond to the notion of  a relevant product mark~t. 
Another difficulty  is_ that a pool oft'en covers catastrophic or aggravated risks.at 
the-same time as normal  risks.  This requires an  examination of the pool under 
Article 11-1  as well as under Article 1 f-2.  · 
b)  The second question only arises if the pool does not (or not entirely) meet the 
criteria of Article  11,  in ·particular· if it exceeds the thresholds. This question is 
whether such a pool  is  necessary to allow 'its  m~mQers  :to  operate in a specific 
market~ In  all  areas of insurance, an Insurer -must,  in order to  be present on a 
•  market without incurring excessive risk,  insure a sufficient' number of risks  so 
that the risk profile of its portfolio· corresponds to'  the average for the totality of 
. risks in the category. There therefore needs to be a  strong probability that the real 
level of claims incurred by' the insurer will be the same as the average level .  of 
claims'' of all  insurers.· This  strong  probability  can  only  be  obtained· above  a 
certain number of risks ·covered  by  the  insurer.  This  is  called  the  minimum 
dimension.  Certain catastrophic risks  may be  such that no individual insurer is 
capable of insuring it alone.  In~such a  case,  the pooling of capacity  does  not 
restrict competition. ff anything, the pool strengthens competition since it allows 
several insurers who are unable alone to provide cover for the risk at hand to put 
their  resources  in  common  and  c~eate a  new  competitor  for  the  benefit  of 
custpmers in need of such cover. It could be added that even for non-catastrophic 
risks,  small' insurers may  need to  group together in pools in  order to  attain  the 
necessary ·minimum dimension. In any event, the Comt:nission will consider that· · 
pools, no matter how high their market share. is, are not covered by Article 81-1. 
(ex~Article 85-1)  when they, are  necessary to  allow their members to provide a 
type of  insurance they could notprovide alone  . 
c)  If the pool is not necessary for coverage of the risks, a third question arises, . 
namely whether or not pool members are under a contractual obligation to bring 
all or part of  their insurance products into the pool. If there is such an obligation 
d'apport,  Article  81.:.1  (ex-ArtiCle  85-1)  definitely  applies,: If there  is  no  such 
obligation, Article  81-1. (ex-Article  85-1) is likely _to  apply if the participating 
members ~0 not have an commercial interest in offering their  :products outside the 
pool (see §33 infine). 
.  .  .  - .  . 
29.  This new approach towards insurance ·pools (especially the second step n;gardirig 
a pool's contribution to reaching a 'certain minimum dimension) in  fact-gives to  -
Article  11  of the Regulation the· effect  in  practice of a  de  minimis  rule.  It h~. 
already been applied to a claim-sharing arrangement between insurance mutuals 
(the equivalent of a pool in the non-profit insurance sector).  In. the P&i Clubs. 
case. (Protection,  and 'Indemnity  insurance)  the  Commissi~:m .concluded  that  ~-· 
10  . Council Directive n°  73/2J9of 24 July. 1973, concerning access to  the activity of direct  ins~rancc· 
other. than non-life insurance, and to its exercise. OJ no L 228/3 of 16 August 1973 .  . 
13 claim-sharing agn:ement h~tween mutuals covering !N
1Y'o  of the. world market  l~u· 
. maritime contractual  and  third  party  liability  insurance is  not  caught hy  Artick · 
X  1-1  (ex-Article 85-1) when it  is necessary to allow its members to otTer the level 
of  cover they now offer ($US 4.25 bi'llion). An in-depth market enquiry involving 
the main brokers and re-insurers operating in the P&I insurance market as well as 
the  P&I  Clubs themselves had. indeed revealed that no  entity or group with less 
than  50% of the market was currently able to offer such a  level of cover.  The 
Commission also. exempted the quotation procedures which prevented Clubs from 
undercutting each other's prices (expressed in so-called_rates per ton). It did so by 
analogy with Article 13 of  the Regulation which allows the setting of  uniform risk 
premiums in co-reinsurance pools, but not that of commercial premiums. Indeed 
the amended quotation procedures will only apply to the Clubs' costs which are 
related to the insured risks (including - for case-specific practical reasons - the 
retention costs). These procedures no lo.nger apply to  the Clubs' administrative· 
costs.  For further details, this Report refers to the recently adopted· Commission 
decision. 
30.  Moreover,  in  September .1997,  the.  Commission's  services  also  undertook  an 
enquiry into the market lor aviaiion  ri~k insurance i·n order to find out whether the 
(noli lied and other} pools operating. in  the  Community fell  within the .scope of 
Article· 8-1-I  (ex-Article  85-I ).  This  enquiry  showed  that  for  most  risks  the 
relevant  geographic  market  is  international  because the  customers (e.g.  airline 
companies owhing a large fleet of aircraft) are large companies who are able to 
look  for  the  best  available  conditions  of insurance  around  the  world.  In  this 
market, none of the pools hold~ a  share that even comes close to the ceilings set 
forth iri Article II of the Regulation. Therefore, none of these pools appreciably 
restricts competition within the meaning of Article 8I-1 (ex-Article 85-1) in this 
market (see first  step of the approach).  In contrast,  for  small, non-catastrophic 
risks (which represent low insured values in relation to,the other aviation risks of 
the same branch), a national market appears to exist. Customers include smaller 
aircraft OWners,  flying clubs Or  parachutist clubs who have limited opportunities 
of looking for better insurance conditions abroad. In these national markets, the 
pools hold a  market share which exceeds by  far the Articlell  thresholds (first 
step). Moreover, they do not seem to be necessary for the coverage of the risks 
(second  step).  However,  the  Commission's  services  decided  not  examine  this 
question  furth<;r.  Their market enquiry  had  indeed  shown that the  coverage of 
these small risks accounted for a very minor share of world-wide turnover. Under 
those c'lrcumstances, the Commission's services concluded early in 1999 that there 
. was no  sufficient Community interest to  find  possible infringements of the  EC 
Treaty's  competition  rules. and  terminated  the  investigation  by  sending 
administrative  comfort  letters  to  the  insurers  who  had  notified  their  aviation 
pools. These letters included a caveat in relation to the national markets, pointing 
out that national authorities could intervene  against the  pool's anti-competitive 
structure  or  anti-competitive· behaviour  by  its  members  if they  considered  it 
appropriate. In two cases, there appeared to be no need any more for a comfort 
letter because, since the notification, the parties had decided to either dissolve the 
pool (Italy) or transform it into a company whichwould offer aviation risk cover 
in  its  own  name· (Netherlands).  For  reasons  of proper  administratio.n,  the 
Conimission's services also inforined in writing the insurers who had not notified 
14 
; their. pqots' but had also been subject to the inarkel  enquiry of the outcome of the 
enqmry_. 
3"1.  Some further points coricer~ing the  Co~mission's-practical eXperieQce with pool~ 
. need to be made.  ·  · 
Firstly,  it  might happen that  insurers  consider a  grouping  as  necessary  at  one 
time,' but not thereafter. This might be because after some tlme the insurers gain 
the minimal. capacity or expertise to insure these risks  atone~ It  is  also possible 
that the size or nature of  the risks covered by the'  pool c;hanges in such a way that 
the  pool.members e:an  insure them alone. The Dutch Invalidileilscentrale (IVC) 
. co-reinsurance pool  for. disability  risks,  which was set up in 1955,  provides ·a 
• telling example. Initially, insurers operated all their business through the pool and 
were unwilling to provide cover alone because they had insufficient experience· 
with such risks. The IVC ·pool was the major market player in the Netherlands. 
But as time passed by, insurers acquired more e  .. xperience and began to,compcte  .  .  ' 
among each other. In  1983, the pool's share had already come.down to 25%.  In 
. 1993, it  had dropped to even less than 5% and in 1994 insurers decided to bring 
no new insurance policies into the pool. The pool only remained in existence for 
the· settljng of exjsting policies. The pool will fade away as insured parties reach 
retirem~nt age  or die.· In this case,  the  block exemption Regulation could  not 
apply, given that the participants in the grouping together held a 'market share 
'  ,  ' 
.. which was distinctly over the threshold of 15% laid down in  Article  11-1.  The 
Commission's service:s  nevertheless  sent an administrative: comfort letter under 
Article 81-3  (ex-Article 85-3). They observed in particular that the risk that the 
participants would co-ordinate their competitive behaviour outside the grouping.· 
(the risk of  "spillover") could clearly be ruled out without further market analysis, 
givep the completely negligible market share ofthe grouping itself. Obviously,.in 
other cases  where  the  pool  proves to  be no  longer ·necessary but still  holds  a 
substantial-market share, the outcome will be different. For instance,in the P&I 
. Ch.tbs  case (see above), the Comil)ission has  reserved the_right to  withdraw the 
exe~ption which· it  has  granted  to  the  quotation  procedure  (see  above  §29), 
should  the  claims-sharing  arrangement  at  some  point· in  time  no  longer  be 
necessary tor its members to offer the level of  cover they then offer.  ·  · 
Secondly,  in  some  pools cases, the  Commission's services have· issued  comfort 
letters ori  the ground that· the global turnover generated by the pool was so small 
that a  further ,examination was not warranted. The turriover figures in question 
. were clearly well below those allowed for SMEs in the Commission's de  minimis . 
- riotice 11 :·  Some  Dutch  pools  covering  professional  risks  (notaries,. real  estate 
agents, etc.) have benefited from this pragmatic approach. In some other cases, 
the insignificant level.of the turnover led the Commission's services· to. clear the 
.  '  '  /  '  .  ''  '  ' 
'·  case  for  lack :of effect on interstate trade (see e.g.  Dutch pool  for  caravan fire 
.,r 
insurance) or to close the. case without formal ising the finding of an infringement ' ' ' 
withiri tqe meaning of Article 81 ~ 1 (  ex-Artic~e 85-1) (see Gerinan car insurance 
1  .l  However,  although this  notice couid not be  relied  on  as  such  because the  insurance companies· 
participating in  the pool cannot be considered as small or medium sized undertakings within  the 
meaning of  that notice.  ·  · 
15 pool  for  third  country  owners  of cars  who·  c;lo  not  show  adequate  liability. 
insurance at the border). 
Thirdly, in some cases, the Commission's services have applied S:traightforward1y 
the  "de  minimis" rule  contained  in  Article  1 C thereby  defining  the  relevant 
product  or  geographic  market  in  a  broad  way  (e.g.  an  Austrian  pool  for 
international  transport  risks  which  appeared  to  obtain  around  a  third  of its 
turnover  from  customers  abroad  was  considered  to  operate  on  a  geographic . 
mark¢t which· was wider than Austria, the market share of another Austrian pool 
-dealing  with  the  insurance  of Volkswagen-type  cars  was  determined  with 
reterence to the wider product market for car insurance, an Italian pool providing. 
entrepreneurs or contractors with. insurance against late- delivery of their  work 
:was  considered  to  operate  in  competition with  financial  institutions  providing 
such companies a hank guarantee against the_-same event). 
C. Perspectives for the future  · 
32.  The  Commission's  services  have  just  launched  their  investigation  into  co-
insurance or co-reinsurance pools dealing with enviro"nmental ·risks and nuclear 
risks. Several of those pools have been notified (the French environmental pool 
Assurpol was actually granted an exemption in 1991. This exemption expired last 
yearl2).  All these  pools will be assessed  in  light of the  three tier legality test 
spelled out above (§28).  · 
33:  A  number .of further  points  concerning  the  future  application  of the  Block 
Exemption to pools can be made. 
Firstly, the Commission recognises that for certain highly atypical risks (~atellites 
and  spacecraft,  for  example),  it  may  not be  possible  to  determine  with  any 
certainty  the  minimum  portfolio' necessary  for  entry  to  the  market,  and  as  a 
consequence,  the  necessity  or otherwise  of the  pool .for  its  memhcrs  cannot 
accurately be evaluated. ht such cases. the Commission intends to give the benefit 
of the doubt to  the pool and clear it,  unless any other specific factors preclude a 
clearance.  · 
· Secondly, it is  possible that~  pool whose members differ greatly. in size may be 
necessary  for  some· members but not for  others,  who  could be .  present on the 
·market without  recourse to the pool.  In  such cases, the  Commission does not 
intend to break up a pool if that deprives the former totally of the chance to be 
present on the market. However, if  the size of  the popl is so large that it could be 
replaced by two or more pools in competition with each other, the Commission 
will insist that it reorganise itselfin such a way. 
Thirdly;  the  Commission  is  aware  of the  fact  that  insurers  may .set  up  co- . 
insurance or co-reinsurance pools for reasons other than to create for themselves 
· the  possibility  to  operate  in a  specific .market.  The pool  may be created  as  a 
vehicle to  permit cross-subsidisation between different types of risks, to jointly 
purchase  reinsurance,  to  increase  the technical  capacity of its  members  or  to 
12  O.J.n°L37ofl4.02.1992,p.l6. 
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si111plify  the  administration of the  insurance of tliflerent  risks.  At.this s·tage  of 
_their  analysis, the Comri1ission's services take the view .however that insurers can 
achieve these objectives without having to pool their" business, in ·other words by  . 
devising alternative methods which arc less restrictive of competition (see §28 ill 
·fine!: 
IV. Safety equipment (Title V)-
A. General information 
-34.  Title V  allows insurers to  fix  by  mutual  agreement a)  technical  specifications 
'relating  to  safety  equipment  and  procedures- to  check  if  this  equipment 
- corresponds to these specifications (Article 14  first' indent) m1d  b)  ~onditions .of -
approval  tor  litters  or  repairers  and  procedures  making  it possible  to  assess 
whether they meet these conditions (Article  14 second indent). This co.,operation 
- enables insurers to evaluate better the 'risks t\lat they cover and to. calculate more 
precisely the premiums. that they receive. It also encourages the maimfacturers.of · 
,..  safety systems to  improve. them  and  thereli.lre  t(l  minin1ise  the  insured  risks.  In 
,theory, the  person insured benefits from this because if he  buys  pow.erful~satety 
. equipment, his risk d~creases and his insurance premium falls..  . .  . 
-J5  ..  As -regards  the  technical :specifications  relating . to  safety  equipment;, the 
Regulation , is  in  _line  with  the .Commission's  new  approach  on  technical-
. ...  harmonisation apd standardisation and as  regards the approach on certification. 
and· tests.  13  This policy:advocates a· harmonisation ·process based mi. the one hand 
on legislation laying down essential requirements, and on the other on. work by 
recognised  European.  standardisation  organisations,  involving.  all  market 
operators.  Accordingly,  Article  14  refers  "in· particular:···  to  -technical 
specifications  "which· are  intended  to  becqme  European standat:_ds"  (See  also 
_recital  16). The words "in particular" show however that technical specifications 
established by  insurers (or their associations) on a national  scale (and therefore 
·_Jacking  a_ European  vocation)  are  also  exemptable  under  the  Regulation. on 
'  condition (inter  alia)  that  they  "are  techn-ically justified  "  (Article  1.5  sub  a). 
Specifications  must·  in  .  particular  include  classificatio'n  according·  to  the  · . 
pcr1orman~e level obtained (Article  15  sub  e).  Article  i  5  thus  subjects  the 
. exemptability  of these  .  specifications  to  '"Cassis  de  Dijon" ·conditions·  of 
legality applicable to  State measures resulting in restriction of free movement of · 
goods within the meaning of  Article 28 (ex-Article '30) of  the treaty  .. 
36.  Regarding the rules of  approval of fitters and repairers;  Article 14· includes ·no 
reference to a European vocation. It is enough that.these rules be ".objective", be 
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion to the undertakings involved~ and concem 
" the professional qualifications of  these companies ".(Article 15 sub b). 
B. Practicatexperience . 
• 13  .See  Council  Resolution  of 7  May  1985  (OJ  C.l36/l  of 4  June  19~5), Communication  of the 
·'Commission of 15  June 1989 (OJ C.267/3 pf 19 October 1989) and Directive 98/34 of Parliament 
and ofthe Counc_il of22June 1998 (OJ C.204/37 of21 July 1998):" 
17 -·,,  ' 
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37.  The Commission's services have only had to examine a few cases involving Tiile 
V  .. /\part  from  a  number of inf(mnal  complaints  relating  to  alarm  systems  i11 
motor  vehicles,  they  received  some .notifications  from  national  associations of 
·insurers  relating  to  safety  equipment  'to  combat  burglary.  In  addition,. the 
European  Insurance  Committee  (EIC)  informed  the  Commission's . services  of 
some .  isolated  initiatives  for  the  sector  .aiming  to . set  up  systems  ','with  a 
European  vocation" (fire-fighting systems, common minimum rules for approval 
of fitters).  It pointed out that on the other hand;··in .the field of anti-theft or anti-
intrusion alarms, few European standards have so far been established. 
38.  In their assessment of the systems in question, the ComJT!ission's services make a 
distinction between two situations. Either the Community legislator has adopted 
harmonisation .directives  in  the  field  concerned.  That  is  the  case  for  motor. 
vehicles, for which an EC approval procedure exists, and for the warning systems 
installed  il-1  these  vehicles,  for which optional. harmonisation  rules  are  also  in 
force 14•  Or no  harmonisation has  taken  place.  This  is. the  case for  other- safety 
equipment.  The  "low  tension"  and  "electromagnetic compatibility"  Directives 
only· in  fact  cover some aspects of this  kind  of equipment.  In  the  absence  of 
harmonisation,  member  States  are  nevertheless  obliged  to  notify  their  draft 
national  technical  rules  to  the  Commission ·and  to  other  member  States•s.  It 
cannot  but  be ·admitted that the voluntary harmonisation work  by  recognised 
European standardisation bodies· (in particular the technical  comm~ttee TC 79 of . 
Cenelec)  has  hardly · progressed,  owing  to  specific  national  regulations  and· 
specifications.  · 
.  ' 
39.  In the first situation (e.g. vehicle alarm systems), the Directives in question aim at 
an. optional harmonisation: while permitting .the Member  St~tes to enact stricter 
rules for equipment manufactured on the national territory, they forbid them to 
. oppose the marketirg of imported equipment if it respects the provisions of the 
di~ecti:ves. It follows mutatis mutandis that Article 81  (ex-Article 85) forbids. the 
insurers'  national associations to  issue re.commendations obstructing freedom of 
·movement of  equipment which. C'-;mforms to the harmonisation directives. Indeed,. 
whaHhe ofticial authorities-.of.a Member State are not permitted to do, pri.vate 
companies cannot do eithcr 16 ~  .  .  · 
14 ·.See .for  the  warning' systems ·Council  Directive  n°74/6l,  OJ. No  L42 oL23. February  1970; as. 
·  codified by Com-mission Directive n°95/56, OJ L286 of·29 November 1995. 
·JS  See Parliament and Council Directive 98/34, OJ n°  L 204 of21 July 1998, which· codifies Council 
Directive 83/189, OJ L 109 of 26 April  1983, which provides for an  information procedure .in  the. 
field of  technical standards and regulation.  · 
16  See Reply to the parliamentary question N°  E-0021/98 of Mr von Wogau : «  ...  Council directive 
. 74/61,  as  last  amended  by Commission  directive 95/56  (  ... )  provides  for  harmonised.technical 
requirements concerning  vehicles  fitted  with  alarm  systems and the  alarm  systems  intended· for 
such  vehicles:  Therefore,  since- I  January  1997,  -Member  States  may·  not  refuse  to  grant 
Community-type  approval  to  vehicles  thus  equipped,. or  those  alarm  systems.  The  insurance 
companies are also required to comply)). 
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For example, if the directive.lays  ~down a determined co.lour for cabling ~ires~or 
warning systems, .insurers could· not oppose·thc m~rkcting of equipment of which 
the wires have the colour laid down by the directive. More generally, nor could 
they· submit equipment accompanied by  an certificate of conformity within the 
meaning ofthe directive;. to a (additiomil) national evaluation procedure to check 
if this equipment respect~ the national  te~hnical specifi_cations. The infringement 
of the competition rules would be all  the 1]10re  patent if the insur.ers' association 
apBlied  a different  tre~tment to alatm systems installed as standard in different 
makes of  vehicles. ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
40.  (n  the  second  situation (e.g. anti-theft ·or  anti-burglary  security systems),  it  is 
·  worth  noting  as  a  preliminary  that  ·orie · cannot  rule  out. a  priori . that 
: recommendatiQns  emanating. from national associations. of insurers  establishing 
. · technical specifications, are subject to :the provisions of the directive envisaging 
~ 7an information procedure  in the field  of technical  standards and regulations  17.  ~ 
·Regarding the conditions for application of Article· 8.1  (  ex~Article 85)~. it follows . 
.  from ArtiCle 1  5 of  the Regulation that these have to be. linked to those relating to 
the.  application  of Article  28  (ex-Article  30) (free. movement  of goods)  and 
Articles 43  (ex-Article 52). and 49 (ex-Article 59) (f~ee movement ·of persons and 
of services).  Unless  there  is  objective justification,· insurers  established  in  a  .. · . 
"·Member State have to respect:the principle of  mutual recognition. They  COlJI'd not 
·  therefore place obstacles in. t,ne .way ofthe rrmrketing of safety equipment legally 
manufactured and marketed in another Member State, or the activities of  fitters or 
repairers. \\/hose  professional qualifications were recognised in another Member 
State. That means that, when this equipment or fitters/iepairers have already been 
. , the. subject ofevaluation procedures in the Mem~er  State.of origin;. they could not 
be subject to such additional procedures in the host Member State. 
In  the context of  its notification of a  recommendation conce'rning anti-burglary 
safety  equipment  for. buildings,  SKAFOR  (the  Danish ·insurers'  association) 
subscribed  to  this  principle. of mutual  recognition.  It  nevertheless  asked . the 
· .. Commission's services 'to permit it to apply an  " intelligent" method making it 
possible  to  test. the  ·performance  of. ·the  safety  equipment  in  question. 
(roonufacture!i in.Denmark or coming from another Member. State.). This method 
would apply both to -:-mechanical  eqqlpment (e.g.  a metal grid behin4 the  frmit 
door of a  building)  and: to  electronic  warning  systems.  Instead of testing  the · 
degree .of resistance  of this  equipment. against  various  fmms of violence,  the 
"intelligent"  method .aims  to  check  to  what· extent  this  equipment  can  be  . 
overcome by tge burglar. The Commission'.s services considered that this method. 
is  acceptable.  Article  15(e)  enables,  the ' insurers  to  establish  technical 
specifications which  in~lude "classification according to  the  p~rformance  .level 
obtained''.  But  the  "intelligent"  method 'has the  aim  of measuring  in a  more 
appropriate  way  the  level  of performance  of the  various  safety  equipment. 
· Moreover, SKAFOR committed itself to entrustin-g a new independent body with 
. the  .. task of testing,  according ·to  this  method,  how well  the  equipment Tesists .· 
disactivation. ·under  these conditions,. the Commission's services have just  closed 
the case by administrative letter.  .  · 
17  Cit. Note 15. 
19 · C. Futu_re prospects 
41.  As the  reference of Article  14,- first  indent,· to  "European standards"  indicates, 
Title V not only permits insurers to agree on specificatiqns, provided that these 
do not obstruct the integration of national markets, but also encourages· them to 
provide a  Community basis for .genuine  European standards  which contribute -
··actively to this integration. In this respect, the experiment was disappointing.  In 
fact,  to the  knowledge. of the Commission's. services,  up till  now no document 
originating  from  associations  of insurers  has  formed  a  basis  for  European 
standardisation  work.  Any  revision  of Title  V  of the  Regulation  should  go 
together with  reflection  on the  application of the  Community  approach  in  the 
ticld of  technical harmonisation based on European standards. In order to create a 
real common market, -the Commission is thinking of  asking European bodies, in a 
.  '  . 
weB dclined-framework, to work out European standards in collaboration with all 
interested parties.  · 
SECOND PART 
CATEGORIES OF AGREEMENTS NOT CONCERNED 
.BY 1HE REGULATION 
I.  .Settlement of claims 
A. General information 
42  ..  As regards claims settlement, agreements between insurers typically cover two 
aspects.  These  two  aspects  c'an  be  presented  separately  or together.  The  first 
aspect concerns &rect compensation for  the person  insured.- Such an agreement 
will enable the persons insured to address themselves directly to their own insurer 
with a  view to. being compensated without having to await the outcome of any 
legal proceedings to establish responsibility. The advantage of  such 'an agreement 
consists in the speed-with which the claim is settled. The second aspect concerns 
the allocation  between  insurers  of compensation  costs;  this  allocation  can  be 
determined on a flat-rate basis or according to a scale ofthe respo~sibilities of the 
.persons insured: An agreement ofthis type enables the insurers to reduce 'their  , 
overheads, which should In theory be reflected in the lev,el of  the premiums. 
B. Practical_ experience 
43.  At the time of the adoption of the Regulation, the Commission had. not gained 
sufficient experience to include claim settlements agreements in the Regulation. 
Six  years  later<  the  experience has  hardly  bec.ome  richer. 'The  Commission's 
services have  had  to ·examine some  notified  agreements  concerning  the  direct 
compensation of persons insured, or the allocation between insurers of the costs 
of this compensation, or a  combination of these two aspects: In all  these cases, 
they  were able to send an administrative letter to the notifying parts confirming 
that the agreements did not raise any problem from the point of  view of  Arti'cie 81 
(ex-Article 85).  · 
\ 
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44.  ll should be stressed that the scope of these agreements was always limited. They 
concerned  claims  giving  rise  -to  relatively  limited . compensation.  Thus,  an 
agreement  by  which· insurers  had  agreed-each  to  ·pay  50%.  ()f  the  payments 
resulting  from  a  collision  between  ships  flying  different  flags  on  inland 
waterways in the Netherlands (without determining responsibility), was limited to 
·compensation claims not exceeding ten thousand Swiss  francs.  The scope of a 
·Spanish agreement covering at the same time the principle of  flat-rate distribution . 
. of compensation costs between insurers and that of direct compensation of the 
persons insured in· the. field of car third party liability  insuranc~ was for its part, · 
limited to  J.Uaximum  claims of one  million pesetas.  The Commission;s services 
considered that_ the  advant~ges resulting from these settlement agreements, which 
cover claims for which the financial stake is limited (speed of  settlement, savings 
on overheads) made up for the possible disadvantages (a certain degree of cross- · 
subsidisation  between the  premiums  paid  by  the persons  insured  not assuming 
·any.  responsibility  and  those  due  by  the  persons  insured  who  incurred 
.responsibility)  .. 
.  .  ) 
45.  M(~re  recently,  the  Commission's  services  - for  the  first  time  - received  a 
complaint' conc~ming a claim settlement agreement.  The complainants advance 
that  the  agreement  leads  to  an  unj'ust  increase  in  their  premium  arid  ~o  a 
phenomenon of unjust cross subsidy between ·persons insured .. The  examina~i<.m · 
of  this complaint is in hand.  ·  · 
C. Future prospects 
46.  In view of the relatively new character of the. complaint of negative effects on 
persons insured of agreements on the settlement of claims, the Commission will 
have to examine fully. the above-mentioned complaint and, if necessary, of other 
cases  which  might  be  brought  to  its  attention,  before  being  able  to  envisage 
·extending the scope of  the. Regulation to this category of  agreements.·. 
-.,:>  '  .... :-·· 
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... H.  Registers of and information systems on aggravated risks 
A.  General-information 
4  7  .·  Agreements on keeping  registers or exchanging information on aggravated risks 
have the aim of making it possible for insurers to know better the nature of the 
risks to be insured. They are in particular used for motor insurance, where such 
registers or specific  informa~ion mechanisms allow,  for  example,  to  know  the 
history of  "bad" drivers or "bad" payers or to account for stolen cars.  · 
These agreements do not fall  normally within Article 81-1  (ex-Article  85-1)  if 
they  restrict ·themselves  to  .  giving  information  on  aggravated  risks.  This 
evaluation  is  without  prejudice  to  measures  applicable  for  the  protection· of 
personal data. r  n any case, a simple -exchange of information on the nature of a 
risk does not appear to have the aim of restricting competition between -insurers. 
It is  different if the exchange of information is  accoinpaJ,lied  by  an  agreement 
·aiming  to  adopt. a  common attitude  with regard  to  the  nsks in  question. -For 
example, recommendations to refuse to cover the aggravated risks in ·question or 
to  raise the risk premiums for these risks (whether it is the simple principle of 
such  an  increase  or o'f a  percentage or fixed  amount of  increase)  fall  clearly 
within the scope of Article 81-1  (ex-Article 85-1) and do not appear exemptable 
under the terms of Article 81-3 (ex-Article 85.;3) (See. already Title II  and Ill of 
the Regulation).  ·  · 
B. PractiCal experience 
48.  Since the  entry  into  force  of the  Regulation;  the  Commission has  only  been 
notified -of three agreements on keeping registers or exchanging information on 
aggravated risks.  In only one case (in Spain), the Commission's. services had to 
insist on the abolition of a  clause  going  beyond the  legitimate object of these 
agreements. This clause compelled insurers to impose a minimum supplement on, 
· the  premiums of "bad"  drivers.  In  the  three  cases,  the' Commission's  services 
declared Article 81-l  (ex-Article 85-1)  inapplicable,  by  administrative  comfort 
letter.  They· specified  that  this  conclusion  was  without  prejudice  to  measures 
applicable for the protection of  personal data.  · 
More complex is the question if it would be appropriate to intervene with regard 
to  agreements  aiming  to  establish  registers  of  bad  risks  if  these  would 
systematically lead .insurers to  refuse to cover those risks.  In  the  absence of a 
formal commitment of the insurers to do this or of a recommendation from their 
association aiming to  encourage  them  no  longer to  insure  these  risks,  Article 
7.1 (a) of  Title III  (prohibiting any clause which excludes damage involving the 
risk  branch  concerned  from  the  cover)  would  not  apply;  In  any  event,  the 
Commission's  services  do  not· have- for ·the  moment  evidence. suggesting that 
insurers carry out such parallel behaviour 
C. Future prospects 
22 ( 
49.  Agreements  limited  to  keeping  registers  and  to  exchanging  information· on 
aggravat6d risks not·appearing likely, apart from exceptional cases, to fall  under 
the scope of Articie 81  (ex-Article 85). Agreements going further will  in theory 1 
have  to  be  assessed  with  respect  to  Titles  II  and  III  of the  Regulation. _The· 
Commission does  not think,  at this stage of its  experience, that it is tim~ly to. 
adopt in this ~onnectio~  a block exemption mechanism.  r 
CON~LUSION 
·so.  The  Regulati(m  applies  to.  two  types  of agreements  concerning  c~mpet1t1on 
parameters·  which, at the time of the adoption of the Regulation., had just been the 
su~ject. of deregulation  at  the  Community  level,  namely  premiums and policy 
conditions.  The objective of the  Regulation  was  to  accompany this  process or 
. deregulation  and  to  ensure  that  the  newly'-created  competition  would  not  be 
restricted by self-regulation initiatives exceeding the limits of what was justified 
by the characteristi'cs of  the insurance sector.  .  ·  .  . 
The question is whether the Regulation ·has achieved this objective. Experience 
. shows that the implementation of  Title II concerning the calculation of premiums 
is  not· easy.  Owing to the technicality of the matter, the Commission's services 
have  difficulties  in  checking  wpether .  or  not  co-operation  as  regards  risk 
premiums is  compatible with the Regulation. However, in the few cases where 
they collected data concerning the (gross) commercial premiums charged by the 
insurers,  the  Commission.'s  services  were  reassured· by  the  range- of these  . 
premiums. With regard to policy conditions (Title III), the .experience emphasises 
a different type of  application problem. An)ong the so-called "-black"  clauses, the 
· most  harmful  for  competition, there are ·several  which  become,  under the  very 
terms of Article 7, exen1ptahlc since their authors declare that they do not commit· 
.  ~  .  '  ' 
Insurers. 
51.  The  examination  of joint  co-jnsurance  or  co-reinsurance  groupings  ("-pools"-) 
under Title IV of the Regulation will remain a priority. The economic approach to 
be followed has been determined (see paragraph 28) and already applied to pools . 
covering _aviation risks. It will be necessary to modify the provisions of Title IV 
in the light of this' approach and its appli<;atiori to the families of  pools currently 
notified to the Commission~ 
Each stage .ofthe economic approach in question raises a question for which the 
answer depends on the. actual facts. The question if  the pool benefits from the de 
. minimis rule  of Article  11  of the  Regulation depends  on the definition of the 
market concerned (first stage). The question of checking ifthe pool is necessary 
tor the coverage of the risk depends on-the minimum size tsecond stage). And the 
question concerning the restrictive character of a pool  for  which there is  not  a 
ohligation d'apport requires that one examines up  to what point insurers 'have an 
economic i,nterest in providing cover outside the pool (third stage). 
52.  The agreements involving Title V _(safety equipment) as well as  thos~ mentioned 
in  the Council's empowering Regulation (claims settlement .and registers of bad 
·23 risks) have not so  l~tr m:eupied a  leadii1g  pla<.:e  in  the adininistrative pmcti<.:c  or 
the Commission. It will ad only i,n  the event of  complaints and then solely insol:u· 
as  the jurisdictions or  natiorial  compdition authorities· arc  not  hcth.:r  placed  to 
examine them.  .  ., 
53.  This  Report gives the  Commission an  opportunity not only to  inform  interested. 
authorities and undertakings of the way in which its services have implemented 
the  Regulation,  but' also  to  collect  facts,  comments  and  suggestions  for 
improvements  from  these  authorities  and  undertakings.  In  this  respect,  if 
necessary, a hearin'g could be envisaged. 
'  ·~  ~'" 
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